TIME: Almanac 1990/1990 Time Magazine Compact Almanac, The (1991)(Time).iso/time/100989/10098900.052

Text File | 1990-09-18 | 5KB | 96 lines

NATION, Page 24

Reading the Fine Print

Those sweeping arms proposals are not all they seem

By Bruce Van Voorst


    After months of coolness and caution, the U.S. and the Soviet
Union suddenly seem consumed by arms-control fever. First,
Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze ended their tete-a-tete in the Tetons by announcing
plans for a spring summit. A few days later, George Bush and
Shevardnadze were at the United Nations competing to see who could
get rid of chemical weapons faster.

    But the most startling symptom of dovishness came from the
Pentagon, in the just-released 1989 edition of Soviet Military
Power. In the past, the Defense Department has used its annual
threat assessment to present the latest scary examples of Soviet
high-tech weaponry. This year's version features a cover photo of
Soviet soldiers in retreat from Afghanistan under the headline
"Prospects for Change." The report concludes, "Today the likelihood
of conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is perhaps as low
as it has been at any time in the postwar era." Admiral William
Crowe, who retired last week as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, agrees. "Every parameter of the strategic environment," says
he, "is in transition."

    Behind the surprising statements and sweeping proposals,
however, a certain gamesmanship was at work on both sides:

    CHEMICAL WEAPONS. Bush offered to destroy 80% of the 30,000-ton
U.S. arsenal in eight years if the Soviets reduce their 50,000-ton
stockpile to the same level. Shevardnadze upped the ante by
proposing that the superpowers unilaterally wipe out their stocks
and cease all chemical-weapons production.

    But Congress has already ordered the President to destroy by
1997 even more of the American stockpile than he proposed.
Moreover, by making the complete elimination of chemical weapons
contingent on the assent of 20 nations deemed capable of producing
them, Bush gave veto power to mavericks like Iraq and Libya. Until
such an agreement is reached, the U.S. insists on modernizing its
supply with new binary nerve-gas weapons -- a position that the
Soviets have termed unacceptable.

    STRATEGIC WEAPONS. Shevardnadze made what appeared to be an
important concession by dropping the Soviet demand that reductions
in ballistic missiles be linked to limits on U.S. testing of the
antimissile Strategic Defense Initiative. The Soviets also proposed
separate discussions on submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles
(SLCMs), despite their earlier insistence that the talks be part
of the strategic-arms discussions.

    Shevardnadze's new flexibility on Star Wars was in part offset
by his warning that the Kremlin would abrogate a future START
treaty if the U.S. goes too far with SDI testing. And the Senate
would certainly want to review any deal on Star Wars as part of a
START ratification process. "The Soviets made a constructive step
which may facilitate negotiations," concludes House Foreign Affairs
Committee chairman Dante Fascell. "But it only puts off the day of
reckoning."

    Nor was it clear that the Soviets would sign a START agreement
without a deal on submarine-launched cruise missiles, whether
achieved separately or not. Even if they do treat SLCMs as a
separate issue, the Soviets are certain to use the negotiations to
propose reductions in naval forces, an issue the U.S. is reluctant
to confront. Discussions about cruise missiles with nuclear
warheads might quickly lead to discussions about SLCMs with
conventional warheads, a weapon for which the Navy has big future
plans.

    NUCLEAR TESTING. The Threshold Test Ban treaty, signed in 1974
but never ratified, provides for a ceiling of 150 kilotons on
underground nuclear blasts -- a limit that both nations currently
observe. Baker and Shevardnadze agreed in principle on verification
procedures that should allow the treaty to be completed at next
year's summit. Yet nuclear testing will remain contentious: the
Soviets still want a comprehensive ban on all underground blasts;
the U.S. insists that nuclear weapons must continue to be tested
for safety and reliability.

    AMERICAN RELUCTANCE. The Administration still seems perplexed
over arms control, fearful of both a domestic right-wing assault
on its policies and of sliding down the slippery slope of
psychological disarmament. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, for one,
is determined to stonewall arms treaties until congressional
funding of his defense budget is ensured. And although Bush allowed
last week that a strategic-arms treaty could be achieved by next
year's summit, key White House aides seem inclined to dismiss START
as a bothersome holdover from the Reagan Administration.

    It can be argued, of course, that American resolve was what
brought the Soviets around. For all the uncertainties, progress to
date is largely due to an almost heedless Soviet willingness to say
da. "This is an entirely different Soviet attitude than we have
ever seen before," says a senior aide to Baker. But until the
Administration decides what to make of that attitude, START -- and
other issues -- could stay stalled.